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Contingent remainders-Defined: A contingent remainder is a legal
future interest after a particular estate of freehold limited upon an event
(precedent in fact and in form to its taking effect in possession) which
may happen before or after, or at the time of or after, the termination
of the preceding estate of freehold. This group of remainders is not
described for the mere pleasure of abstruse classification but because
certain important legal attributes attach to remainders of this class.
1
From the time of the feudal land law to the present day they have
been inalienable inter vivos while they remained contingent. Prior to
i43 o they were wholly void. After that they became valid if the event
upon which they were limited happened before or at the time of the
termination (whenever arid however that might occur) of the preceding
estate of freehold. This was later translated into the rule that the
contingent remainder was destroyed unless the event upon which it
was limited happened before or at the time of the termination of the
preceding estate of freehold. Thus the rule became the rule of
destructibility of contingent remainders. Then illogically enough,
after springing and shifting future interests by way of use or devise
became valid and indestructible, contingent remainders still continued
to be destructible by a rule of law defeating intent even when the con-
tingent remainder was created by way of use or devise. The charac-
teristics of inalienability and destructibility (together, no doubt, with
others) have required the drawing of a line between contingent
remainders-which are inalienable and destructible,--and vested
remainders-which are alienable and indestructible. Because shifting
and springing executory interests were held to be indestructible it is
also necessary to draw a line between them and contingent remainders.
The continuation of the rde of destructibility of contingent
remainders after springing and shifting future interests become valid
and indestructible: It became settled in Chudleigh's Case
2 and
1 [The attention of the learned reader is called to further discussion of such
attributes in Sweet, Contingent Remainders and Other Possibilities (1918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 977.-ED.]
'(1594) I Coke i2oa, Kales, Cases on Future Interests, 82.
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Archer's Case,3 at the end of the sixteenth century, that the rule of
destructibility would apply to contingent remainders created by way
of use or devise. It was not till later that it became settled that
springing and shifting uses and devises were not only valid but inde-
structible.' When that occurred the logical incongruity in leaving con-
tingent remainders destructible by a rule of law defeating intent, if as
events turned out they would take effect as springing future interests,
became apparent. Renewed efforts seem, therefore, to have been made
to defeat the application of the rule of destructibility of contingent
remainders." These failed presumably because the feudal rule of
destructibility had become established and acted upon." The announce-
ment that contingent remainders would still be destructible in spite
of the fact that springing and shifting uses and devises were valid and
indestructible was made by declaring in substance that if a future
interest after a particular estate of freehold could by possibility take
effect as a remainder it must do so or fail entirely. It could not take
effect as a springing or shifting future interest. Lord Hale in Purefoy
v. Rogers7 said:
"Where a contingency is limited to depend on an estate of freehold
which is capable of supporting a remainder, it shall never be construed
to be an executory devise, but a contingent remainder only afid not
otherwise."
Lord Northington in Carwardine v. CarwardineO said:
"It is a certain principle of law, that wherever such a construction
can be put upon a limitation as that it may take effect by way of
remainder, it shall never take place as a springing use or executory
devise."
Lord Ellenborough in Doe v. Roach9 said:
" . . . it is a rule of law that no limitation shall operate by way of
executory devise, which, at the time of the testator's death, was capable
of operating by way of contingent remainder."
Lord St. Leonards in Cole v. Sewell'0 said:
' (i599) I Coke 66b, Kales, Cases on Future Interests, 98.
'Pells v. Brown (i62o, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 59, Kales, Cases, 65; Gray, Rule
Against Perpetuities, sec. 159; Snow v. Cutler (1664, K. B.) I Lev. 135; Gray,
op. cit. sec. 165.
SWeale v. Lower (1672, K B.) Poll. 65; Southcot v. Stowell (1678, C. B.)
i Mod. 226, 237, 2 Mod. 2o7; Sugden, Powers (8th ed.) 33-34.
W eale v. Lower, Southcot v. Stowell, supra; Carwardine v. Carwardine
(i757-8, Eng. Ch.) i Eden, 27, 34; Sugden, Powers (8th ed.) 34-37.
'(1681, K. B.) 2 Wms. Saund. 38o, 388; Kales, Cases, ioi.
(1757-8, Eng. Ch.) i Eden, 27, 34.
(1816, K. B.) 5 M. & S. 482, 491, 492.
(1843, Eng. Ch.) 4 D. & War. x, 27.
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"Now, if there be one rule of law more sacred than another, it is
this, that no limitation shall be construed to be an executory or shift-
ing use, which can by possibility take effect by way of remainder.""
'
The same idea as that contained in the above quoted passages was
expressed in the rule that you could not by events happening after
the interests were created turn a contingent remainder into a springing
executory interest. This in effect forbade any attempt to split by
operation of law the contingencies upon which the contingent
remainder was limited. You could not say that the happening of the
contingency before or at the time of the termination of the preceding
estate of freehold was one event, and that the same event happening
afterwards was another, and that the two were split by operation of law
because if the event happened before or at the time of the termination
of the preceding estate of freehold the future interest became a vested
remainder, while if it happened afterwards it took effect as a spring-
ing executory interest.
Application of the rule of destructibility in the modern cases-where
the remainder is limited to an individual: Where the future interest
after the particular estate of freehold was limited to an individual on
an event which might happen before or at the time of or after the ter-
mination of the preceding estate of freehold, the event must happen
before or at the time of the termination of the preceding estate or fail
entirely. The common instance of this is where the limitations are to
A for life and then to the first son of A who reaches twenty-one. Here
the expressed intent is that the son of A who first reached twenty-one,
either before or after the termination of A's life estate, is 
to take.12
Nevertheless, if A dies before any son reaches twenty-one the entire
remainder fails."' Nor would the result be any different if the testator
said that the rule of destructibility was not to apply. In White v.
Summers'" it was held that where the remainder was limited to the
eldest son of A "who shall first attain or have attained the age of
twenty-one years," the testator meant to include the eldest son no
matter when he reached twenty-one, whether before or after the termi-
nation of the life estate. Nevertheless the contingent remainder was
destroyed. It is submitted that even if the limitations were to A for
life and then to the eldest son of A who "either before or after As
death" shall have attained twenty-one, the case is not in the least altered.
The meaning expressed is the same. The remainder is still limited
'Many other expressions to the same effect can be found. See Gray, op. cit.
(3d ed.) secs. 92a, 92i."
White v. Summers [19o8] 2 Ch. 256, Kales, Cases, 134.
"White v. Summers, supra. If In re Wrightson (C. A.) [9o4] 2 Ch. 95, is
contra, it must be regarded as wrong or as repudiating the entire rule of destruc-
tibility of contingent remainders. For explanation of this case see White v.
Summers, supra; Gray, op. cit. sec. 926; Kales, Future Interests, sec. 9i.
1, Supra.
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to the same person and upon the same event precisely as it was before.
There are not two gifts on separable contingencies. There is one gift
in remainder on one event with a precautionary phrase declaring that
it is no part of the event upon which the eldest son is to take that he
shall reach twenty-one before the termination of the life estate. The
future interest as limited may take effect as a remainder. The rule
requires that it do so or fail.
Again, take the common case where the limitations are to A for life
and then to B if he survive A. This means that B is to take whenever
he survives A, either at the termination of A's life estate or after the
premature termination of A's life estate, by forfeiture or merger. Yet
B's remainder fails if the life estate terminates prematurely during A's
life."" Can it then make any difference that the remainder is limited
"to B if he survive A, whether such survivorship occur at the time of
or after the termination of A's life estate"? The expressed intent is
the same as it was before. The additional words used merely empha-
size the fact that B is to take no matter when the survivorship occurs
with reference to the termination of the preceding life estate. This
makes more plain, but it adds nothing to, what was said before. The
character of the remainder is the same. It should be held destructible.
Suppose the remainder be limited to a class and when the life estate
terminates no member of the class has attained a vested interest: Sup-
pose, for instance, the limitations be to A for life, remainder to such
children of A and B as survive A and B. It is conceded that this
means that the children who survive A and B no matter when that
occurs-whether at the time of or after the termination of A's life
estate-are to take' Yet, if at A's death B is still living so that no
children have survived B, the remainder to the entire class of children
fails by reason of the rule of destructibility."*
' Dunwoodie v. Reed (1817, Pa.) 3 Serg. & R. 434. The same result occurred
where the remainder was limited to an individual on a collateral contingency
other than survivorship. Lyle v. Richardson (1823, Pa.) 9 Serg. & R. _i=;
Waddell v. Rattew (1835, Pa.) 5 Rawle, 231.
"' Cunlyffe v. Brancker (1876) 3 Ch. Div. 933. Here Jessel, M. R., speaking of
just such a future interest, says: It is impossible that the will should take effect
not "through any defect of expression of intention, but through the fault of the
rule of law."
"' Cunlyffe v. Brancker, supra.
So where the remainder is to a class who to take must survive the life tenant,
and the life estate terminates prematurely by forfeiture or merger, none have
survived the life tenant and therefore the remainder to all is destroyed: Redfern
v. Middleton (1839, S. C.) Rice L. 459; Faber v. Police (1877) 10 S. C. (io
Rich.) 376; McElwee v. Wheeler (1877) 1o S. C. (1o Rich.) 392; Abbott v.
lenkins (1823, Pa.) io Serg. & R. 296; *Stump v. Findlay (1828, Pa.) 2 Rawle,
i68; Belding v. Parsons (i915) 258 Ill. 422, ioi N. E. 570; Barr v. Gardner
(1913) 259 Ill. 256, io2 N. E. 287; Messer v. Baldwin (1914) 262 I1. 48, 1O4
N. E. I95; Smith v. Chester (i916) 272 II. 428, 112 N. E. 325; Blakeley v.
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If the limitations are to A -for life, remainder to such children of A
as attain twenty-one, it must be conceded that as a matter of interpre-
tation this means that the children of A who reach twenty-one, either
before or after the termination of A's life estate, are to take. This is
decisively demonstrated by the fact that the moment the rule of destruc-
tibility is removed by statute or because the interests are equitable, so
that full scope is given to the expressed intent, the children who reach
twenty-one after the death of the life tenant are allowed to take."'
Yet, if at A's death none have reached twenty-one none at all can take.
The remainder fails or is destroyed.19
Suppose now there is added in the above cases the expressed direc-
tion that the remaindermen are to take whether the event happens
before or after the termination of the life estate. Suppose, for
instance, the limitations are to A for life, remainder to such children
Mansfield (x916) 274 Ill. 133, 13 N. E. 38; Benson v. Tanner (1917) 276 Ill.
594, 115 N. E. 191.
The same is true where the remainder is limited to a class on a collateral event
other than survivorship of the life tenant, and the life estate terminates prema-
turely by forfeiture or merger. In such a case none of the class is entitled to
a vested interest and the entire remainder is destroyed. Craig v. Warner (1887)
16 D. of C. (5 Mack) 46o; Bond v. Moore (ipog) 236 Ill. 576, 86 N. E. 386.
" Astley v. Micklethwait (i88o) 15 Ch. D. 59, Kales, Cases, 122; it re Robson
igi6] i Ch. x16; In re Bourne (1887, Eng. Ch.) 56 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 388;
Blackman v. Fysh (C. A.) E1892] 3 Ch. 2og; In re Freme [18gi] 3 Ch. 167, 170;
Challis, Real Property (2d ed.) iii.
In Festing v. Allen (1843, Ex.) 12 M. & W. 278, after a gift to the issue of the
life tenant who attained twenty-one, there was a gift over "for want of any
such issue." At the death of the life tenant there were several children, but
none had reached twenty-one. The gift to the children failed, but the gift over
could not take effect because the event had not happened upon which it was
limited, that is, because "for want of such issue" meant "for want of issue
of the life tenant as should, either before or after the death of the life tenant,
reach twenty-one." Perceval v. Perceval (187o) L. R. 9 Eq. 386, accord. In
Dean v. Dean [i8gi] 3 Ch. I5o, the legal limitations were to A for life and then
to such children of A "as either before or after the death of A" should attain
twenty-one. In discussing whether the expressed intent of the settlor was, in
this case, any different from what it was where the limitations were to A for
life and then "to such children of A as attain tventy-one," Chitty, J., says,
very frankly: "So far as the testator's intention is concerned, the meaning of
the limitations is the same; in both cases the testator intends that all the children
who attain twenty-one, whether before or after the death of the tenant for life,
shall take; and it would seem strange to anyone not acquainted with the nicety
of the law relating to real property in this country, that any different legal effect
should be given to a mere difference in words which mean the same thing."
"Festing v. Allen (1843, Ex.) 12 M. & W. 278, Kales, Cases, io8; Rhodes v.
Whitehead (i865, Eng. Ch.) 2 Dr. & Sm. 532; Holmes v. Prescott (1864) 33
L. J. Ch. 264; Bull v. Pritchard (1847, Eng. Ch.) 5 Hare, 567. In Browne v.
Browne (I857, Eng. Ch.) 3 Sm. & G. 568, the remainder to the children was
erroneously held vested subject only to be divested if the children died under
twenty-one.
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of A as "either before or after the death of A" attain twenty-one, and
suppose at A's death no child has attained twenty-one. It is submitted
that the case is not in the least altered. The meaning is exactly the
same as it was before. The nature of the future interest is the same.
It may still take effect as a remainder or as a springing executory
interest. According to the rule it must take effect as a remainder or
fail entirely. There are not two gifts to two separate classes, one to
take in one event and the other in another. There is a gift to one class
on one event only, namely, attaining twenty-one. The additional
language is again simply a precautionary emphasis of the intention that
this event is not in any way restricted so that it must occur before
A's death, but that the children who reach twenty-one are to take
no matter when the event happens. Lechmere & Lloyd's Case0
rightly understood does not prevent the remainder in the case put
from being destructible, in view of the fact that in that case there
were at A's death children who had attained twenty-one and the ques-
tion was whether the interest of those who were in esse but who had
not attained twenty-one was destroyed. That is quite a different case
subject to quite different considerations from the one now being con-
sidered where at the life tenant's death no children at all had attained
twenty-one. The propriety of this distinction is dealt with at length,
hereinafter . 2  Nevertheless, Chitty, J., in Dean v. Dean,22 where none
of the children had reached twenty-one when the life estate terminated,
thought Lechmere & Lloyd's Case controlled and held the future inter-
est to the children who should reach twenty-one to be indestructible.
He asserted that the limitations involved were precisely the same in
meaning as those presented in Festing v. Allen,2 3 where the remainder
was limited to the children who reached twenty-one without saying
"either before or after the death of the life tenant." He admitted
that the reasoning by which the future interest in the children who
reached twenty-one was destructible in Festing v. Allen and took effect
as an executory devise in Dean v. Dean, while "subtle" was "not more
subtle or artificial than the reasoning of a scholastic character which
the common-law judges of former times applied to cases of this kind."
The court might as well have said that a distinction without a differ-
ence was allowable to avoid the feudal rule of destructibility and give
effect to the testator's intention. The fact is that so long as the rule
of destructibility is recognized and supported on principle, Dean v. Dean
is logically wrong. So long as the rule of destructibility is recognized
as itself an anachronism and logically a mistake after springing and
shifting interests became valid and indestructible, Dean v. Dean may
"In re Lechmere & Lloyd (i881) 18 Ch. D. 524, Kales, Cases, 126.
"Post, p. 665.
EI89I] 3 Ch. i5o, Kales, Cases, 128.Supra, note 18.
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be justified as the refusal to apply the rule of destructibility to a
remainder limited in language to which the rule had never before been
applied.
Now suppose the remainder is limited to a class, but before the life
estate terminates the interest of one member of the class has vested,
and other members of the class are in esse who might according to the
expressed intent take vested interests in the future. Typical cases
stated and analyzed: Suppose the limitations are (i) to A for life,
remainder to such children of A as reach twenty-one; and (2) to A
for life, remainder to such children of A as "either before or after A's
death" reach twenty-one. Both cases are the same so far as the
expressed intent is concerned. The first means exactly what the
second more emphatically says. The second gives to the children of
A the same remainder as the first on the same contingency, merely
inserting the precautionary phrase which emphasizes that the contin-
gency of reaching twenty-one is to have no reference to its occurrence
before the termination of the life estate. There is no separation of the
children into two classes and the giving to each class an interest on a
different contingency. If no children have reached twenty-one when
the life estate terminated it is assumed that the entire remainder would
be destroyed in both cases alike.
2 4
Suppose, however, that before the termination of A's life estate in
both cases one child, X, has reached twenty-one so that the remainder
has vested in him. Clearly, no rule of destructibility can interfere
with X's interest. Suppose there is another child, Y, who has not yet
attained twenty-one. Is his interest destroyed by A's death before Y
reaches twenty-one?
In both cases alike it might be said that the interest of Y could by
possibility take effect as a remainder because if Y reached twenty-one
before the determination of the life estate Y would become a co-owner
of the remainder with X and as such would be a remainderman. Fur-
thermore Y's interest would be one limited on an event which might
happen before or after or at the time of or after the termination of the
life estate. Looked at solely in its relation to the life estate Y's interest
would seem to have all the attributes of a contingent remainder which
was destructible. But that would be only a partial view of the case
presented. If such a remainder had been limited to a class before the
statutes of uses and wills, it may be assumed that only the first member
of the class in whom the remainder vested would take. The interests
of the other members of the class would be looked upon as shifting
future interests divesting the fee which had already vested in X and
would be wholly void for that reason. When, however, a remainder
to a class was attempted to be created after the statutes of uses and
"Ante, p. 659.
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wills and by way of use or devise, it was valid so far as the other mem-
bers of the class were concerned simply because shifting interests by
way of use and devise were allowed. It follows that Y's interest was
at all times until it vested, a shifting executory interest. It took effect
by way of divesting a vested remainder in fee. It was bound from
the beginning to take effect in that way if it took effect at all. It was
likewise void under the feudal land law. It was valid only by way of
use or devise. As such why should it not be indestructible? The fact
that when it vested it was like a remainder was of no more consequence
than if the limitations had been to A for life, remainder to B and his
heirs, but if B died within two years to C in fee. Here C's interest,
if B died within the two years and A still lived, might take effect as a
remainder, but only after it had divested a previously vested remainder.
Hence it was at all times till it vested a shifting executory interest and
as such must have been valid and indestructible.
Obviously, the cases put at the commencement of this paragraph
were bound to be the point of contention between those who would
extend or press to its logical conclusion the maintenance of feudal prin-
ciples regarding the validity of future interests and those who would
extend to its logical conclusion the new liberty in creating future inter-
ests permitted by the statutes of uses and wills. It is not a case of one
faction being right and the other being wrong, so much as it is which
of two inconsistent and competing principles shall prevail in a given
case. Sympathy with the changes wrought by the statutes of uses and
wills so as to free testators' and settlors' efforts from the restrictions
of the feudal land law, together with a lively appreciation of the fact
that when springing and shifting future interests by way of use and
devise were allowed and became indestructible the feudal rule of
destructibility of contingent remainders not only defeated the expressed
intention but became logically unsound, would (provided authority did
not prevent) easily tip the scales in favor of the remainder to Y being
valid and indestructible.
State of the English authorities-where the limitations are to "A
for life, remainder to such children of A as reach twenty-one" and
where at the time of A's death X, one of the children of A, has reached
twenty-one and another, Y, has not: Fearne seems to say that Y's inter-
est is destroyed. He says :25
'For where a contingent remainder is limited to the use of several,
who do not all become capable at the same time: notwithstanding it
vests in the person first becoming capable; yet shall it devest as to the
proportions of the persons afterwards becoming capable, before the
determination Of the preceding estate."
The suggestion that the child who attains twenty-one after the deter-
mination of the life estate will not take is very cautiously stated, and
Fearne, Contingent Remainders, 312, 313.
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Fearne cites no authorities actually holding that Y's interest is
destroyed. Jarman says :26
the rule before the act was, that those children alone took who
attained twenty-one before the particular estate determined, to the
exclusion of others who might afterwards attain that age."
No cases, however, are cited actually so holding where the validity of
Y's interest was involved. Theobald says :27
only those children can take whose interests become vested
before the determination of the life interest,
'28
but he cites no cases precisely so holding and involving the right of
Y to take. In Blackman v. Fysh29 Lindley, L. J., assumes without
question (though the case did not turn on this) that
"the limitations to the children were clearly contingent remainders,
and if the son had died, those of his children only who had before his
death attained twenty-one, or being daughters had married under that
age, would take. Then we should have been obliged to give effect to
the rules of law as to contingent remainders, and to defeat the inten-
tion of the testator that those who afterwards attained twenty-one
should participate."
These dicta rather induce the conclusion that while direct authority
may be lacking, yet conveyancers and conveyancing counsel in England
have for a very long time acted upon the assumption that the above
statement of the law and its application were correct. Perhaps it is
now too late to overturn the conclusions stated, so that in England it
must be accepted that the feudal rule of destructibility applies to Y's
interest and defeats it. Yet the precarious position of such a conclu-
sion at once appears when we have come to observe the result reached
Vol. i (6th Am. ed.) *833.
'Wills (7th ed.) 312.
28 See also Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) 125.
In Mogg v. Mogg (1815, Eng. Ch.) i Mer. 654, Kales, Cases, 232, the limita-
tions were in substance to A for life and then to the children of B born and to
be born. Some children were born before the life estate had terminated and
some after. It was held that the children born afterwards could not take. It is
not made clear whether this was because the rule of destructibility applied or
because a rule of construction for the determination of the class fixed the testa-
tor's actual intention as including only children born before the determination of
the life estate. See post, p. 667.
In Archer v. Jacobs (19o4) 125 Ia. 467, IO N. W. 195, the limitations were to
A for life and then to her children. Two were in esse when the life estate
terminated -by merger. It was held that the remainder to the unborn children
was terminated by the rule of destructibility. Whether this could have gone on
the rule as to the determination of the class, see post, p. 667.
21 (C. A.) [1892] 3 Ch. 2o9, 223.
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by Sir George Jessel, M. R., in Lechmere & Lloyd's Case and the favor
with which that case was received.2 0
Where the limitations were "to A for life, remainder to such chil-
dren of A as, either before or after A's death, reach twenty-one" and
where at the time of A's death, X, one of the children of A, has reached
twenty-one and another, Y, has not: Here we have precisely the same
case as that dealt with in the preceding section. The fact that the
remainder is limited to such children as "either before or after the
death of A" attained twenty-one makes no difference in the expressed
meaning. It does not make a gift to two separate classes on different
events. The gift is still to the same class on the same event. Pre-
cautionary words have merely been added to make it plain that the
children are to take no matter when the event occurs with reference to
the termination of the preceding life estate.
Hall, V. C., in Brackenbury v. Gibbons,3 1 evidently observing that
the case now presented was exactly the same as that dealt with in the
preceding section, and believing the law to be as there stated, held the
interest of Y to be destroyed.
Five years later precisely similar limitations came before Jessel,
M. R., in Lechmere & Lloyd's Case.3 2 He said the rule of destructi-
bility was "harsh. Why should I extend it?" He clearly felt that
he had a case which he could deal with in the freest manner on principle
and that on principle the rule of destructibility should be held down to
the precise cases where its applicability had been determined by author-
ity. The continuance of the doctrine of destructibility after springing
and shifting future interests became valid and indestructible was
illogical and anomalous. Jessel was prepared on this ground to refuse
the application of the rule of destructibility in any case where authority
did not require it. In the case where the remainder had already vested
in one member of the class the feudal rule requiring the vesting of the
remainder before the termination of the life estate was certainly satis-
fied and it was clear that the interests of the other members of the
class were bound to take effect as shifting executory interests divesting
a previously vested remainder. Authority, so far as judicial decisions
were concerned, was apparently entirely lacking to require an applica-
tion of the rule of destructibility to Y's interest. It may be assumed
that the practice of conveyancers had never dealt extensively with the
case where the remainder was limited to the children "who either
before or after the termination of A's life estate attained twenty-one."
Jessel, therefore, very properly insisted that the rule of destructibility
should not be applied.
Jessel should have admitted that the logic of his conclusion would
have made Y's interest indestructible where the remainder was "to
8 Post, 666.
(1876) 2 Ch. D. 417.'lit re Lechmere v. Lloyd (i8gi) 18 Ch. D. 524, Kales, Cases, 126.
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such children of A as reached twenty-one," and that if Y's interest in
such a case was to be regarded as still destructible it was because a
long continued practice of conveyancers required that it should be so.
The weakness of Jessel's opinion is that instead of doing this he put
forward a purely subtle and scholastic distinction without a difference
between the case where the remainder was to "such children of A as
reached twenty-one" and where the remainder was to "such children
of A as either before or after A's death reached twenty-one."
In Miles v. Jarvis33 the limitations were to A for life, remainder to the
children of B "living at the time of A's death or thereafter to be born."
At A's death some children were in esse and the remainder had vested
in them. Hence, the indestructibility of the gift to those afterwards
to be born was clear upon the reasoning upon which Lechmere &
Lloyd's Case is to be supported. In In re Bourne3" the limitations were
to A for life and then to such children of A as should attain twenty-
one. The mystical words "before or after A's death" were not pres-
ent. There was merely a clause that trustees were to take the rents
and issues during the minority of any child after the life tenant's death
upon trust for the child, thus showing that children who did not reach
twenty-one till after the life tenant's death were expected, and expressly
intended tQ take. Two children reached twenty-one before the life
tenant died and Kay, J., held that the gift took effect in the others as
an executory devise. This, it is submitted, presses Lechmere v. Lloyd
far toward its logical conclusion that in all cases where the limitations
are to A for life, remainder to such children of A as reach twenty-one,
without the words "either before or after A's death" the interest of.
Y is indestructible.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has extended the rule of In re
Lechmere & Lloyd logically to the case where the limitations are to A
for life, remainder to such children of A as reach twenty-one, and
where one child has reached twenty-one before the life tenant's death:
This is the holding in the recent case of Simonds v. Simonds. 5 The
court seems very clearly to have perceived that where the remainder
vested in two children before the life estate terminated, the interest of
the other children took effect only as a shifting use and as such was
not subject to any rule of destructibility. The court very properly
relied upon Lechmere & Lloyd's Case and in Massachusetts no doubt
very properly threw out any distinction between the case of a remainder
to the children "who reached twenty-one" and the children who "either
before or after the life tenant's death" reached twenty-one. There
was, in all probability, no conveyancers' practice in Massachusetts
which would require the rule of destructibility to be applied in one of
3 (1883) 24 Ch. D. 633.
(1887, Eng. Ch.) 56 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 388.
9(Io8) I99 Mass. 552, 85 N. E. 86o, Kales, Cases, .148.
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these cases any more than in the other. It is believed that in other
American jurisdictions the result. reached in Simonds v. Simonds ought
to be and will be followed. 8
Where the remainder is to a class the operation of the rule of destruc-
tibility must be distinguished from the operation of rules of construc-
tion for the determination of the class: Where the limitations are to
A for life, remainder to the children of B who reach twenty-one, if
the rule of destructibility be in force and applicable, only such children
will take as reach twenty-one before the termination of the life estate.
If that rule is not in force or is inapplicable then the question arises
as to how many are included in the class. This is a question of con-
struction. If the usual rule as to personal property be followed the
class will close when the life tenant dies or the first child reaches
twenty-one, whichever last happens." But if this be regarded as a
rule which cuts down the natural and usual meaning because of the
inconvenience of having new interests arise in .personal property after
it has been distributed, then where real estate is involved and there is
not the same inconvenience, the natural and usual meaning of the words
might be taken and the class enlarged to include all the children born
at any time. This was done in Blackman v. Fysh18 'where -the
remainder was to children born or to be born who should live to attain
twenty-one.
Now suppose the limitations are to A for life, remainder to the
children of B, and B has a child or children at the date of the will,
at the testator's death and at the death of the life tenant, and others
are born afterwards. Does the class close at A's death? If the rule of
destructibility is in force and applicable this need not be decided,
because that rule will permit only those children who are in esse at the
testator's death to take.39 If the rule of destructibility be not in force
"Observe, however, that in Archer v. Jacobs (19o4) 1-25 Ia. 467, I01 N. W.
195, where the limitations were to A for life and then to A's children, and before
the termination of A's life estate by merger two children were born, the court
held that the interest of the unborn children was destroyed. Lechinere &
Lloyd's Case and its logical extension was not observed. Perhaps the result
reached might have gone on the ground that by a rule of construction concern-
ing the determination of classes the class closed when the life estate terminated
and the remainder vested in possession.
"Theobald, Wills (7th ed.) 310. In re Robson [1916] I Ch. I16, In re Bourne
(1887, Eng. Ch.) 56 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 388, and Simonds v. Simonds (i9o8)
199 Mass. 552, 85 N. E. 86o, only needed to go this far.
(C. A.) [1892] 3 Ch. 209.
"In Mogg v. Mogg (1815, Eng. Ch.) i Mer. 654, Kales, Cases, 232, it is
impossible to say whether the court went upon the application of the rule of
destructibility or a rule of construction as to the determination of the class.
The learned author in 3 Preston, Conveyancing, 555, evidently thought that the
rule of destructibility applied. In Archer v. Jacobs (i9o4) r25 Ia. 467, 1o
N. W. 195 the thildren born after the termination of the life estate by merger
were excluded on the ground of the application of the rule of destructibility.
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or not applicable, then the question of construction arises as to the deter-
mination of the class, and the reasoning already indicated is applicable.
If personal property were involved the class would close at the life
tenant's death.40 If that is in accordance with the fair and primary
meaning of the language used then it should apply equally where real
estate is involved. If, however, the natural and primary meaning
would include all the children of B born at any time, but that meaning
is cut down because of the inconvenience of holding up a distribution
of personalty until all possible members of the class are ascertained,
then such reason of convenience would not have the same application
where real estate was involved and all the children born at any time
might be let in to share in the remainder.
Now suppose the limitations are to A for life, remainder to the chil-
dren of B, but B has no child when the will was made or at the tes-
tator's death or at the death of the life tenant, can children born
afterwards take? If the rule of destructibility is in force and appli-
dable they cannot. If that rule is not in force or is not applicable, then
if personalty were involved all the children born at any time could
take.41 In Hayward v. Spaulding42 the same rule was applied to a
remainder in real estate which was not destructible.
The rules for the determination of classes are rules of construction
merely and yield at once to any expressed intention inconsistent with
them. Where, for instance, the remainder, as in Lechmere & Lloyd's
Case,43 was limited to the children of the life tenant who should "either
before or after the life tenant's death" attain twenty-one, the words
quoted were obviously inserted to overcome any supposed rule of con-
struction that where the remainder was to children who reached twenty-
one only those were intended to take who had reached twenty-one when
the life estate terminated. The phrase "either before or after the life
tenant's death" did not therefore change the character of the remainder
or the meaning to be given to the language by which it was created.
It did not make distinct gifts to two different classes. In Miles v. Jar-
vis" the limitations were to A for life and then to the children of B
"who survived A or were born afterwards." The phrase "who sur-
vived A or were born afterwards" was plainly put in to overcome any
rule of construction that only such children would take as were born
prior to the death of the life tenant. The extent of the class was made
clear. Then the question of the destructibility (by a rule of law defeat-
ing intent) of the interest of those not born until after A's death, arose.
As to the application of the rule of destructibility where the future
interest is limited on such events that it may take effect either as a
"Theobald, Wills (7th ed.) 3o6, 3o7.
' Ibid. 307.
* (i9o8) 75 N. H. 92, 71 Atl. 2I9.
'In re Lechmere v. Lloyd (1881) 18 Ch. D. 524, Kales, Cases, 126.
"(1883) 24 Ch. D. 633.
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remainder or as a shifting interest cutting short a prior vested
remainder in fee: In all the cases where the rule of destructibility of
contingent remainders has been applied, the future interest which was
destroyed has been so limited that if no rule of destructibility existed
and the event happened after the termination of the preceding estate
of freehold, there would be a gap in the estates expressly limited and
the future interest if it took effect would have cut short a reversion in
fee in possession. It should be observed that precisely the same situa-
tion may be presented except that the future interest, if it took effect,
would cut short a vested remainder expressly limited which might
have come into possession. Thus, suppose the limitations are to A for
life, remainder to A's children (now unborn), but if A leaves no chil-
dren who shall reach twenty-one then to B in fee. Here B's interest
may take effect as a remainder. This occurs if A dies leaving no
children. The possibility that B's interest may take effect as a
remainder continues as long as A has no children. On the other hand,
the moment a child is born to A it takes a vested remainder and B's
interest then takes effect, if at all, as a shifting future interest. If the
rule of destructibility is that a future interest which may possibly take
effect as a remainder vesting before or at the time of the termination
of a particular estate of freehold must do so in that way or fail entirely,
B's future interest in fee will fail and be destroyed the moment A's
child is born. 45
If it is a corollary of the rule of destructibility, or a part of it, or the
rule itself, that future interests which may by possibility take effect as
remainders, must do so or fail entirely and cannot be turned into execu-
tory interests by events happening after the creation of the limitations,
then B's interest fails as soon as a child is born to A. It cannot be
doubted that under the strictly feudal land law B's interest would be
destroyed on the birth of a child to A. It is equally clear that when
springing and shifting uses and devises became valid and indestructible
the application of such a rule of destructibility was illogical and incon-
gruous. It continued only because it had been established. But
Lechmere & Lloyd's Case and those following it " show that in these
days the courts regard themselves as fully authorized to refuse to
extend the rule of destructibility beyond the precise cases where its
application has become settled, and that any feature of the remainder
which gives it a novelty sufficient to enable the court to say that its
destructibility has never been passed upon is a valid ground for holding
that the rule of destructibility shall not be applied to it.
The result reached in Challis v. Doe41 might have gone on the ground
"See Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3d ed.) sec. 338, note 3, and Challis





that the remainder to B in the case put was subject to the rule of
destructibility and could not therefore be void for remoteness. It is
significant that the court refused to put its decision on that ground and
insisted that the contingencies might be split by operation of law. On
the contingency that A had no children B's interest was a contingent
remainder and must vest if at all on A's death. In the event that A
had children but they died under twenty-two, B's interest was a shift-
ing executory devise and void for remoteness. The testator did not
split the contingencies by his words. They were split by the court, by
operation of law, because in one event the future interest was a
remainder and in the other it was an executory devise. This splitting
of the contingencies by operation of law is in fact a refusal to apply
the rule of destructibility to B's interest so that it would fail the
moment a remainder vested in the child of A. Such it is submitted
was a proper result for the House of Lords to reach, and the decision
of Jessel, M. R., in Lechmere & Lloyd's Case proceeds upon the appli-
cation of the same principle, namely, that the rule of destructibility will
not in these days be permitted to apply to any remainders presenting
distinctive features to which authority or long practice does not force
the courts to so apply it.
Abolition of the rule of destructibility by legislation: In the absence
of any legislation abolishing the rule of destructibility even American
courts, where the survival of feudal principles might be regarded as
least likely to occur, have regularly recognized and applied the rule of
destructibility of contingent remainders.48 During the nineteenth cen-
,8 ist: Cases where the'destruction of contingent remainders was held to have
occurred:
District of Columbia: Craig v. Warner (1887) 6 D. of C. (5 Mack.) 46o.
Mississippi: Irvine v. Newlin (1885) 63 Miss. 192.
South Carolina: Redfern v. Middleton (1839, S. C.) Rice L. 459; Faber v.
Police (1877) io S. C. (xo Rich.) 376; McElwee v. Wheeler (1877) 1o S. C.
(io Rich.) 392.
Pennsylvania: Lyle v. Richar.ds (1823, Pa.) 9 Serg. & R. 322; Abbott v. Jenkins
(1823, Pa.) ro Serg. & R. 296; Stump v. Findlay (1828, Pa.) 2 Rawle, 168;
Bennett v. Morris (1835, Pa.) 5 Rawle, 9, 15; Waddell v. Rattew (1835, Pa.) 5
Rawle, 231. Dunwoodie v. Reed (1817, Pa.) 3 Serg. & R. 435, is only contra to
the extent of maintaining that a common recovery by the holder of the particular
estate does not bar the contingent remainder. Upon this point it was clearly
overruled.
Illinois: Bond v. Moore (x9o8) 236 Ill. 576, 86 N. E. 386, Kales, Cases, 144;
Belding v. Parsons (913) 258 Ill. 422, 1o1 N. E. 57o; Barr v. Gardner (913) 259
Ill. 256, 1o2 N. E. 287; Messer v. Baldwin (14) 262 Ill. 48, 1o4 N. E. 195; .Smith
v. Chester (igi6) 272 II. 428, 112 N. E. 325; Blakeley v. Mansfield (1916) 274 Ill.
133, 113 N. E. 38; Benson v. Tanner (1917) 276 IIl. 594, 115 N. E. 19'.
Iowa: Archer v. Jacobs (19o4) 125 Ia. 467, ior N. W. 195.
2nd: Cases containing dicta recognizing the doctrine by which contingent
remainders may be destroyed,
Kentucky: Edwards v. Woolfolk's Adm'r. (1856) 56 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 376.
New Hampshire: Dennett v. Dennett (x86o) 4o N. H. 498.
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tury statutes both in England and the United States have under-
taken to abolish wholly or in part the rule of destructibility.
The Real Property Act of 184549 provided that any contingent
remainder existing after 1844 should be capable of taking effect
"notwithstanding the determination by forfeiture, surrender, or merger,
of any preceding estate of freehold, in the same manner in all respects,
as if such determination had not happened."
This act, however, failed to provide for the case where the preceding
estate of freehold terminated from causes other than those mentioned.
A contingent remainder was, therefore, still liable to be defeated by
the death of the life tenant before the contingency had happened. In
1877 another contingent remainder acte° was passed which applied only
to contingent remainders created by an instrument executed after
August 2, 1877, and provided that every contingent remainder
"which would have been valid as a springing or shifting use or execu-
tory devise or other limitation had it not had a sufficient estate to sup-
port it as a contingent remainder, shall, in the event of a particular
estate determining before the contingent remainder vests be capable
of taking effect in all respects as if the contingent remainder had origi-
nally been created as a springing or shifting use or executory devise or
other executory limitation."
A doubt has long existed, and still remains, whether the act of 1877
applied where the remainder was to the children of a life tenant who
reached twenty-one and one child had reached twenty-one before the
termination of a life estate and others were in esse who might do so
afterwards."1  It has been suggested 2 that a simple and comprehensive
form of contingent remainders act might be worded as follows:
"No remainder or other interest shall be defeated by the determination
of the precedent estate or interest prior to the happening of the event
or contingency on which the remainder or expectant interest is limited
to take effect."
Illinois: Madison v. Larmon (1897) ixo Ill. 65, 48 N. E. 556. See also Young v.
Harkleroad (1896) x66 Ill. 318, 46 N. E. 1113,' and Spencer v. Spruell (xg2)
196 III. I1g, 63 N. E. 621.
Haywood v. Spaulding (igo8) 75 N. H. 92, 7I At. 219, Kales, Cases, I52,
refused to apply the rule, but only by the subterfuge of appointing trustees to
preserve the contingent remainder.
Simonds v. Simonds (1go8) 19 Mass. 552, 85 N. E. 56o, Kales, Cases, 148,
as already explained, ante p. 666, is a correct application of the reasoning upon
which Lechmere & Lloyd's Case is to be sustained and a logical deduction from
the result reached in that case.
'8- Vie. c. Io6, sec. 8.
5040-41 Vie. c. 33.
'Williams, Seisin, 2o5; Jarman, Wills (6th ed. by Sweet) '445; Vaizey,
Law of Settlements, xi64, II65. The point was left undecided in In re Robson
[I9x6] i Ch. 1I6.
"Kales, Cases, 155.
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This, however, fails to cover the case mentioned, ante p. 668. To do
so we might add to it the following: "and any rule which requires a
future interest which by possibility may take effect as a remainder to
do so or fail entirely is hereby abolished."' 3
The only states which seem to have a complete Contingent Remainders Act
are given in Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) sec. i6oo, note, as follows: Ala.,
Ga., Ind., Ky., Mich., Minn., Mont., N. Y., N. Dak., Va., W. Va., Wis. To this
should now be added Massachusetts.
In some states the act which now is in force or has existed has a partial effect
only, like the English Act of 1845: Maine: Rev. St. 1871, ch. 73, sec. 5. Massa-
chusetts: Rev. Laws 19o2, p. 1268, sec. 8. The acts in both these states antedate
the English Contingent Remainders Act of 1845. The Massachusetts act appears
in Rev. St. 1836, ch. 59, sec. 7; the Maine act in Rev. St. 1841, ch. 91, sec. IO.
In South Carolina (i Rev. St. 1893, ch. 66; I Code of Laws 192o, see. 2465)
the act goes no farther than to provide that a contingent remainder shall not be
"defeated by feoffment with livery of seisin."
In Texas the statute goes no farther than to provide that the remainder shall
not be defeated by the alienation of the particular estate, either by deed or will,
or by the union of such particular estate with the inheritance by purchase or
descent. Battis' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, sec. 626.
